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Abstract
A patient-centric DRM approach is proposed for protecting privacy of
health records stored in a cloud storage based on the patient’s preferences
and without the need to trust the service provider. Contrary to the current
server-side access control solutions, this approach protects the privacy of
records from the service provider, and also controls the usage of data after
it is released to an authorized user.
1 Introduction
Storing and maintaining health records in electronic form and making them
available through electronic means has been a growing trend in recent years.
This could be in the form of electronic health record (“EHR”) wherein patients’
health information is collected and managed by an enterprise (such as a hospi-
tal), or personal health record (“PHR”) in which patients create, update, and
manage their own health record [15]. Hybrid systems have also been designed
in which patients and other parties both contribute to collecting and updating
health information, and each have some level of authority in its management.
Examples of such systems are the open source and research frameworks such as
MedVault [9] and Indivo [8], and commercial services such as Google Health [1]
and Microsoft HealthVault [3].
Besides such terminological subtleties, we use the term EHR as a general
term to refer to any form of health record stored in electronic form.
Hosting services to store and manage health records have been considered
recently in order to centralize the storage of the records and make them available
to numerous parties that need to access them; examples are family doctors, lab-
oratories, pharmacies, research institutions. Such services effectively provide a
form of storage-as-a-service as well as software-as-a-service to users with benefits
such as user-friendliness, Internet centricity, and scalability which are important
properties of a cloud environment [16]. We refer to such systems as a cloud of
health records.
Security and privacy of the records in such a cloud environment is crucial
because health data are among the most private and sensitive data about indi-
viduals, and cloud environments in general give little security guarantee: records
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stored in a cloud environment will not only be visible to the service provider, but
possibly to other parties as the actual physical storage may be spread over sev-
eral geographical locations owned by different parties. Moreover, records may
be exposed during transition. Failure to provide sufficient protective measures
may make the health record a detriment rather than a facilitator to patients’
health, as incomplete or inaccurate information may be entered in the record
due to privacy concerns [12]. An important requirement for a cloud of health
records is then, to make data accessible only to those who are authorized.
In a patient-centric approach to managing health records, the patient has
the main role in creating and controlling access rights of other parties to her or
his records. Such an approach advocates the view that regardless of where the
data is stored, the patient should be the main authority to decide with whom
her or his health record is shared and to what extent. Empowering patients to
control access to their own healthcare information has also been mentioned as
one of the goals in health information systems [5].
One of the challenges of giving the patient full-control over the health record
is that the reliability of data may become questionable as the patient may
modify the content of documents originating from other sources, such as doctor’s
prescriptions or laboratory test reports. In this paper, we propose a patient-
centric model in which patients can fully control with whom their record is
shared, but to keep the information reliable, they are not allowed to modify the
content authored by other parties.
Current medical record hosting systems mostly use traditional server-side
access control in which the service provider is trusted to hold the data and en-
forces the access control policy that the owner determines. This means that
patients must fully trust the providers and the internal employees can access all
the information stored in the service provider’s storage space. This is particu-
larly crucial in a cloud environment where the data storage may be scattered
over various physical locations. Also, if server-side access control is the only
measure of protecting privacy, the data will be revealed if such measures are
bypassed by an outsider, for example as a result of policy misconfiguration or a
successful attack. Lastly, server-side access control mechanisms are ineffective
in providing lifetime security guarantee for data; that is, as soon as data is
provided to a client, they can perform any operations that they wish, including
making the data available to others. For example, an authorized doctor may
download and save parts of a patient’s record, and subsequently share it with
unauthorized parties, contrary to the server-side policies.
Our approach to secure management of health records in a cloud is based on
digital rights management (“DRM”) technology. DRM technology was initially
developed for the protection of copyrighted multimedia content [7] and later
applied to the protection of personal data [6, 14, 13]. In this approach, data
is always kept in encrypted form and the owner issues licenses that state the
permitted operations a user can practice on it, using a trusted terminal. A more
detailed description of DRM technology will follow in Section 3.
DRM technology can be used to express security and privacy policies and to
ensure they are enforced. The DRM approach elegantly addresses the three main
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problems identified in secure management of data in a cloud of health records:
(a) in DRM systems data is always in encrypted form and thus inaccessible to
unauthorized users, (b) users can only access the data according to the policy
stated in the license that accompanies the encrypted data, and (c) contrary to
traditional access control mechanisms, DRM can enforce the usage policy even
when data is on a receiver’s terminal, thus, preventing unauthorized copying or
distribution of data that may lead to authorized access.
2 The Health Record Hosting System
A hosting system for health record provides the infrastructure to store and access
the records for different parties. Patients can access the application based on
different business models, such as subscription, and then enter, modify and
see their medical information. Patients can also use the service to share their
records, in full or in part, with other individuals such as health professionals,
or organizations such as hospitals, laboratories, or research institutes. In such
cases the third party is allowed to see parts of the EHR and may also be allowed
to append new information, such as diagnoses or lab reports.
Sometimes patients need to transfer the authority to control the records to
others; for example, in case of seniors. Emergency access is another well-known
situation in medical systems in which health professionals need to break access
control rules to check necessary health information in case of emergency health
conditions.
The hosting system is implemented as a client-server application, usually
web-based, where the data and application logic reside on the servers and a
thin client, such as a browser is used to access the server. In the simplest
form, health records are stored in a back-end storage, usually a database, and a
web-based application is provided through which the data can be accessed and
modified by different users.
Such a system requires an identity management infrastructure that issues
identities to users including patients and health professionals. The identity
information must be verifiable by the service provider, but it is strongly rec-
ommended that the identity management authority be different from the cloud
service provider. We assume that a secure identity management system exists
and all system participants have the required identity information.
The main requirement for protection of privacy in such systems is that only
parties who are deemed authorized by the patient be able to access the record
and only for the operations that are approved by him or her. This is mostly
decided on a least-privilege basis, that is, the minimum required permissions for
performing the job; for example, a nurse needs the permission to check or update
some basic health information of an assigned patient, but must be prevented
from accessing other parts of the record, such as blood test reports.
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Figure 1: The reference model of the digital rights management system [7].
3 The Digital Rights Management Solution
Digital rights management technology provides “persistent access control” in
which access to data remains under control through its lifetime. This contrasts
with traditional access control systems in which there is no control on the use of
data when access is granted. The main mechanism used in DRM is encryption of
data and trusting a DRM agent to enforce the policies expressed in the license
of use. Figure 1 shows the reference model for a digital rights management
system [7]. The data provided by a provider is encrypted using a content key
and only those users to whom a valid license is issued are able to decrypt and
use the content. The license includes terms and conditions of access to the
content in a machine-readable format, and also includes the content key in a
cryptographically packaged form that is only extractable by the party to whom
the license is issued.
On the user’s side, a trusted agent is used to open the content. Trusted agents
use special tamper-resistant software or hardware technologies and normally
have unique cryptographic identity. The trusted agent is trusted in the sense
that it is guaranteed to enforce the policy settled by the license and enable
access to neither the content key nor the unencrypted form of the content.
In our proposed model for a health record cloud, the originator of a doc-
ument, which can be the patient or a health professional, takes the role of
provider and license issuer and controls the policies governing the use of data.
The health record service provider has the role of the distributor by providing
the protected content to the authorized users but does not have access to the
content in clear-text form.
In the following sub-sections we describe describe protocols by which,
• patients create new records;
• patients view and update existing records;
• patients share the records with third parties for reading;
• third parties append new content records;
• researchers may search records;
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• patients delegate control of their record to someone else; and
• health professionals obtain access to records in emergency situation
within the digital rights management model. In the description of the protocols,
we assume Alice and Bob are respectively a patient and a physician interacting
with the system. We also assume they have certified public and private keys
assigned to them as part of a public-key infrastructure the details of which
belong to the identity management system that we do not discuss in this paper.
We denote the public and private key by Pu and Pr respectively where the
index shows the owner of the key. Moreover, we denote the set of rights in a
license by R, again, with the index identifying the user to whome the rights are
granted.
Note that the cryptographic operations attributed to Alice or Bob are actu-
ally meant to be performed by their trusted DRM agent; decryption takes place
within such an agent and keys will not be revealed to the users.
3.1 Creating a New Record
Creating a protected record begins by creating an empty record, and a random
content key to be used for its encryption. We assume that the service provider
has some method of authenticating patients using an identity service provider.
Each patient will be allotted a storage space in two parts; the content part
in which the record content is stored, and the license repository which stores all
the corresponding licenses required for accessing different parts of the content.
Initially, there is only one license that contains the randomly-chosen content
key and is issued by the patient to herself.
The record is composed of an index (I) and the actual content (C). The
index stores a list of the entries in the record, and the license for each entry. This
will help the application to look for a specific entry without fetching the entire
record. Figure 2 shows an entry of the index. An index entry may contain
more metadata; for example, type of the content, or its author, to facilitate
lookups. The index is particularly important in controlling the right to append
new content to the record as will be discussed in Section 3.4. Note that the
index is kept in encrypted form, but it is encrypted as a separate package so that
reading the index does not require decrypting the rest of the record contents.
Creating a new record takes place as follows:
1. Alice authenticates herself to the service provider.
2. She requests to create a new record; the service provider assigns a blank
storage space to her.
3. Alice creates a blank index (IAlice).
4. She chooses a random content key, K, and encrypts the record index using
that key: {IAlice}K .
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Figure 2: An entry of the EHR index.
5. She issues a license to herself with full-control right. The license also in-
cludes the content key, encrypted with her public key: {RAlice , {K}PuAlice}.
6. She sends the encrypted index along with the issued license to the service
provider to be stored.
When the size of the record grows, it is necessary in practice to choose mul-
tiple content keys and encrypt different blocks of the record with different keys.
It also facilitates selective release of different parts of the record in protected
form using cryptographic measures rather than solely trusting the DRM agent.
3.2 Viewing and Updating the Record
The patient can log in to see the latest version of the record and append or up-
date information such as latest observed symptoms, drug effects, etc. However,
The patient is not allowed to modify contents authored by other parties, such as
the lab tests or doctors’ diagnoses, but is allowed to annotate such content by
adding comments [8]. Such annotation can be considered as appending a new
document to the record that bears a link to an existing document.
Viewing, appending or updating information by the patient takes place as
follows:
1. Alice authenticates herself to the service provider.
2. The service provider sends the encrypted record together with the license
to her: {CAlice}K , {IAlice}K , and {RAlice , {K}PuAlice}.
3. She uses her private key to obtain the content key, K, from the license
and decrypt the record.
4. She views or modifies the record as desired. In the case of adding new
content to the record, she also needs to add an entry to the index of the
record.
6
<XrML version="1.2" xmlns="" purpose="Content-License">
<BODY type="LICENSE" version="3.0">
[[- Issued Time -]]
[[- Issuer -]]
[[- Issued Principals -]]
<WORK>
[[- Identifying information of the content -]]
<RIGHTSGROUP name="Main-Rights">
<RIGHTSLIST>
[[- Granted Right -]]
</RIGHTSLIST>
</RIGHTSGROUP>
</WORK>
<CONDITIONLIST>
[[- Condition -]]
</CONDITIONLIST>
</BODY>
[[- signature -]]
</XrML>
Figure 3: An example of the structure of a license in XrML 1.2 [4].
5. If she modified the record, she re-encrypts the modified version with the
content key and transmits it to the service provider.
In order to access information created by third parties, such as prescrip-
tions or lab reports, the patient needs a license issued by the creator of that
information. Section 3.4 describes this case in more detail.
3.3 Sharing the Record as Read-Only
By issuing a suitable license, patients can make selected blocks of their records
available to health professionals for reading. Such a license must contain:
• the identity of the DRM agent of the health professional to whom it is to
be issued;
• the identifier of the record part to which it corresponds;
• the content encryption key, itself encrypted by the public key of the DRM
agent of the health professional; and
• any other conditions under which the health professional may read the
record such as time or location constraints.
Figure 3 depicts an example of the structure of a license in XrML 1.2 which
is used in Microsoft’s ActiveDirectory Rights Management solution [2]. In this
particular type of license, the content key is embedded as an auxiliary section
within in the RIGHTSLISTS tag.
The health professional may then view the record (or part thereof) by re-
questing the license and record from the service provider, and having his or her
DRM agent open the record according to the license. The protocol is similar to
the one discussed in Section 3.2 except that the content key is extracted from
the license issued to the health professional.
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There are cases where patients share their records with an organization
rather than a particular individual. Note that this does not necessarily mean
the entire organization can access the record, but rather, it means that the par-
ticular individual(s) who need to access the record are not known in advance
and are selected by the authorities within the organization. For example, when
the patient is hospitalized, different practitioners may be assigned for providing
health service whose identities are not known in advance. Other examples are
when a patient chooses to volunteer in a research project or shares parts of the
record with an insurance company to adjudicate insurance claims. Thus, it is
neither possible nor efficient that the patient looks after sharing with each single
individual.
In such cases, the patient can give a whole organization, or part of it, per-
mission to access the record by issuing a license to an authorized domain [11].
An authorized domain is a collection of DRM agents such that any agents in the
domain can access the content encryption key in a license issued to the domain.
Membership of an authorized domain is managed by a domain manager whom
the license issuer trusts to admit agents to the domain only if they are trusted.
Alternatively, patient can issue a license with the delegate right to the entity
that represents the organization.
3.4 Appending to the Record by Third Parties
Some parties with whom the record is shared have the right to update it. For
example, a doctor may add a prescription or a specialist in a laboratory may
add a diagnosis report for the results of a lab test. In order that a third party
be allowed to append new content, the patient issues a license that grants the
append right.
The third party encrypts the authored content with its own content key
and issues an appropriate license to the patient so that she can read the new
content and share it with other parties, such as other doctors. This takes place
as follows:
1. Bob authenticates himself to the service provider.
2. He downloads the index of Alice’s record and the corresponding license
issued to him by Alice: {IAlice}K , {RBob , {K}PuBob}.
3. He extracts the content key from the license, decrypts the index, and
appends a new entry.
4. He chooses a random content key (K ′) to encrypt his authored content.
5. He sends the encrypted content to the service provider: {C ′Alice}K′ .
6. He issues a license for Alice in which the suitable content key to view the
content is included. The license gives Alice the right to read the content
and the right to delegate this right to others: {R, {K ′}PuAlice}, wherein
R = {read , delegate}.
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7. He sends the license to the service provider where it is stored in Alice’s
license repository.
The right to delegate right enables Alice to use her DRM agent to extract
the content key and use it to issue a license (with the read right) to someone
else. For example, if Alice later sees another physician, say Thomas, she can
issue a license granting him the right to read the content authored by Bob.
In case two health professionals are working in collaboration, one can issue a
license directly to the other so that no intervention from the patient is required.
Also, there are times when the doctor does not want to allow the patient to see
the content due to health considerations, in which case the patient will not be
given the right to read for a certain period of time, and collaboration between
the physicians can only take place in a direct manner.
If the index did not exist or it was not protected, a malicious user could
upload unauthentic content, such as a fake diagnosis, with a corresponding
license. Although the service provider is assumed to have appropriate access
control mechanism to stop such an attack, the index enables a DRM-enforceable
mechanism on top of it. Not having an appropriate license, such an attacker
will be unable to open and update the index and hence what she or he adds
to the record will not be considered authentic. Nonetheless, this does not stop
a denial-of-service attack in which the attacker uploads random voluminous
content to use up the space allocated to the record, without caring whether or
not the uploaded content is considered part of the record. Also, if attackers get
write access to the record they can delete or destroy its contents. Such attacks
can only be prevented by server-side mechanisms.
3.5 Candidate Selection
One of the important benefits of keeping health records in electronic form is to
provide new opportunities for medical research by enabling studies over larger
populations and finding larger number of subjects for the studies. This requires
searching and selecting suitable patients that meet certain criteria. For instance,
a research project may be interested in patients with chronic kidney disease who
also smoke and whose age is above 50.
In the current design, since records are kept in encrypted form, running
global queries to find patients with some characteristics is not possible at the
server side unless a cleartext index of some of the patients’ attributes is kept
and used for some basic searches. For instance, if there exists an index of
patients’ ages, search queries regarding the age can be responded on the server
side without any need for decrypting the content. But such indices leak some
information about the record and can only be kept for general and non-sensitive
attributes.
Another approach for searching is to deliver queries to the DRM agent where
the record exists in cleartext, and get the agent to run the query. In this
approach, queries are executed in a distributed fashion by the agents and records
that satisfy the query are marked.
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A push or pull approach, or a mix of both can be followed for delivering
queries to the agents. In the push approach, search queries are added to the
profiles of all users and are executed when patients log into the agent. In the pull
approach, interested patients fetch the available queries and have them executed
by their agents. Some form of indexing can also be used as a complementary
measure to filter the target patients. For instance, a query may be assigned
only to the patients in a certain geographical location or of a certain age range.
Distributed execution of the queries requires that the patient, or someone on
her or his behalf, log in to actually execute the query, and will fail for inactive
patients who do not check their record regularly. However, a different messaging
system, such as email or text messages can be used to notify the patient about
pending queries and encourage a log-in. Other incentives, financial or otherwise
(e.g. free check-up of the record by a specialist) may also be added to the
process in order to attract patients to participate.
The following steps show how one example of the distributed search protocol
will work. We assume a push approach that sends the query to patients.
1. The interested party, for example a research organization, submits the
search query to the service provider.
2. Depending on the model, the service provider adds the query to profiles
of all, or a group of, patients.
3. Alice authenticates herself to the service provider.
4. Alice fetches the encrypted record and opens it; this resembles what was
described in Section 3.2. The query is also fetched; if the query itself is
confidential it is delivered in encrypted form with a corresponding license
that allows the agent to only execute the query without showing it to the
user.
5. The agent runs the query on the cleartext record.
6. If the record matches the criteria of the query, Alice is asked by the agent
to issue a license to share the record, or some part of it, with the interested
party.
7. If Alice agrees with sharing information and issues the license, she sends it
back to be stored in the service provider’s database and be made available
to the interested party.
Mention should be made that such a search mechanism is mostly suitable
for the use-case of selecting candidate participants for a research program where
there is a query that can be checked independently against different records.
Other types of queries, such as complex data mining queries or statistical
searches that need counting the exact number of patients meeting certain crite-
ria, are more difficult or infeasible to implement using this method. Moreover,
the identity of the users who do or do not match a query is revealed to the
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service provider, which may be undesirable for sensitive queries. Another issue
with this method is that running the query may take a long time, which does
not suit real time applications.
3.6 Delegation
Delegation is the case where patients need to transfer all or some of their author-
ity to another person; for example in the case of seniors or users with limited
computer skills who cannot work with the health record application. Delegation
can be handled by issuing a special delegation license that enables another per-
son to take control of the record. The delegation license includes the identity
of the delegator and the delegate, the content key which is in turn encrypted
by the public key of the delegate, and also the period of time during which the
delegation is valid.
A different form of delegation can take place in case of children or people
with mental disabilities in which the service provider initially issues credentials
for the guardian, with or without time limits, as necessary.
3.7 Emergency
Since the records are all kept in encrypted form nothing but a key recovery
mechanism can enable emergency access to the record. A key escrow authority
can be used to store all patients’ keys and reveal them in the case of emergency.
To keep the model consistent, this can be implemented as a special organization
to which every patient issues a delegation license. Once an emergency situation
arises, the emergency authority can be asked to issue a temporary license for
dealing with the case. Separating the emergency authority from the service
provider, and after-the-fact auditing whenever emergency situation is declared,
are some measures that can mitigate the risk of abuse.
4 Discussion
4.1 Thin Client Assumption
It is common in cloud application to assume very minimal requirement on the
client side, often only a standard browser. In the system we proposed, more
processing power, as well as more functionality is assumed on the client side,
since it should implement a DRM agent and must be capable of performing
standard cryptographic functions. This is not an unrealistic assumption though,
since most hand-held devices are already capable of performing DRM functions
for other applications such as ebook readers or music players.
4.2 Rights Templates
Specifying the rights for each issued licenses can be cumbersome and error-prone
for patients. Standard license templates with standard sets of rights can be
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designed and used to facilitate issuing licenses for typical cases such as visiting
a doctor, a clinic, etc.
In case of research institutes where more customized sets of rights may be
required, the research organization can build rights templates which the agent
can show to the patient when asking for consent. It is also possible that the
patient specifies some general preferences to be automatically compared with
the requested rights, similar to the case of P3P agents for privacy policies on
the web [17].
4.3 Federation
For large populations, assuming a single service provider is neither scalable nor
practically realistic. Thus, it may be the case that multiple service providers and
multiple application servers, possibly in different geographical locations, collab-
orate and provide a unified access mechanism to a large number of records.
In such cases, some form of federation is necessary among the storage and ap-
plication servers to make such a service possible. For example, there should
be federated identity management, so that users can be authenticated globally
among all servers of all collaborating service providers. Identity federation is
a well-studied problem and solutions exists to enable such service [10]. Other
aspects of federation pertaining to our proposed approach are:
• Standard for Record Format: There should be an agreement about
the format for representing and storing the records. Alternatively, DRM
agents can be made capable of supporting all the existing formats. Note
that inter-domain translation is not an option since the records are kept
and transmitted in encrypted form.
• Standard for License Format and Rights Language: Licenses and
the rights language used in them will be used in all of the federated do-
mains, and thus, they should follow a standard format. Again, an al-
ternative is that the DRM agents be able to support all existing formats.
Inter-domain translation is only possible if licenses are not fully encrypted.
• Standard DRM Agents: DRM agents should be able to communicate
with all service providers in order to be able to fetch the records stored in
a different domain in cases where the record is shared with the users of a
different domain.
4.4 Other Supporting Technologies
Supporting technologies such as mobile phone applications, smart cards, etc.
can be used to facilitate the implementation of the use-cases mentioned above.
Using smart cards, for instance, can automate some of the use-cases by storing
user credentials and, for instance, in the case of sharing the record with a doc-
tor, a secure reader device at the doctor’s office can be used by the patient to
automatically issue the necessary license for the doctor to read the record.
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5 Conclusion
This paper proposes using DRM technology for protecting the privacy of health
records stored in a cloud storage, based on a patient-centric approach. We
reviewed how different typical use-cases should be implemented for enabling
DRM-based protection of the records and discussed several challenges that are
worth elaboration.
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